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Abstract
The collection and analysis of telemetry data from user’s devices is routinely
performed by many software companies. Telemetry collection leads to improved
user experience but poses significant risks to users’ privacy. Locally differentially
private (LDP) algorithms have recently emerged as the main tool that allows data
collectors to estimate various population statistics, while preserving privacy. The
guarantees provided by such algorithms are typically very strong for a single round
of telemetry collection, but degrade rapidly when telemetry is collected regularly.
In particular, existing LDP algorithms are not suitable for repeated collection of
counter data such as daily app usage statistics.
In this paper, we develop new LDP mechanisms geared towards repeated collection
of counter data, with formal privacy guarantees even after being executed for an
arbitrarily long period of time. For two basic analytical tasks, mean estimation and
histogram estimation, our LDP mechanisms for repeated data collection provide
estimates with comparable or even the same accuracy as existing single-round LDP
collection mechanisms. We conduct empirical evaluation on real-world counter
datasets to verify our theoretical results.
Our mechanisms have been deployed by Microsoft to collect telemetry across
millions of devices.
1 Introduction
Collecting telemetry data to make more informed decisions is a commonplace. In order to meet
users’ privacy expectations and in view of tightening privacy regulations (e.g., European GDPR law)
the ability to collect telemetry data privately is paramount. Counter data, e.g., daily app or system
usage statistics reported in seconds, is a common form of telemetry. In this paper we are interested
in algorithms that preserve users’ privacy in the face of continuous collection of counter data, are
accurate, and scale to populations of millions of users.
Figure 1: Local Model of Differen-
tial Privacy
Recently, differential privacy [12] (DP) has emerged as defacto
standard for the privacy guarantees. In the context of teleme-
try collection one typically considers algorithms that exhibit
differential privacy in the local model [16, 22, 18, 8, 5, 3, 25],
also called randomized response model [26], γ-amplification
[17], or FRAPP [1]. These are randomized algorithms that
are invoked on user’s device to turn user’s private value into a
response that is communicated to data collector and have the
property that the likelihood of any specific algorithm’s output
varies little with the input, thus providing users with plausible
deniability. Guarantees offered by locally differentially private
algorithms, although very strong in a single round of telemetry collection, quickly degrade when data
is collected over time. This is a very challenging problem that limits the applicability of DP in many
contexts.
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In telemetry applications, privacy guarantees need to hold in the face of continuous data collection.
Recently, in an influential paper [16] proposed a framework based on memoization to tackle this issue.
Their techniques allow one to extend single round DP algorithms to continual data collection and
protect users whose values stay constant or change very rarely. The key limitation of the work of [16]
is that their approach cannot allow for even very small but frequent changes in users’ private values,
making it inappropriate for collecting counter data. In this paper, we address this limitation.
We design mechanisms with formal privacy guarantees in the face of continuous collection of counter
data. These guarantees are particularly strong when user’s behavior remains approximately the
same, varies slowly, or varies around a small number of values over the course of data collection.
Our results. Our contributions are threefold.
• We give simple 1-bit response mechanisms in the local model of DP for single-round
collection of counter data for mean and histogram estimation. Our mechanisms are inspired
by those in [26, 9, 8, 4], but allow for considerably simpler descriptions and implementations.
Our experiments also demonstrate performance gains in concrete settings.
• Our main technical contribution is a rounding technique called α-point rounding that borrows
ideas from approximation algorithms literature [19, 2], and allows memoization to be applied
in the context of private collection of counters while avoiding substantial losses in accuracy
or privacy. We give a rigorous definition of privacy guarantees provided by our algorithms
when the data is collected continuously for an arbitrarily long period of time. We also
present empirical findings related to our privacy guarantees.
• Finally, our mechanisms have been deployed by Microsoft across millions of devices starting
with Windows Insiders in Windows 10 Fall Creators Update to protect users’ privacy while
collecting application usage statistics.
1.1 Preliminaries and problem formulation
In our setup, there are n users, and each user at time t has a private (integer or real) counter with
value xi(t) ∈ [0,m]. A data collector wants to collect these counter values {xi(t)}i∈[n] at each time
stamp t to do statistical analysis. For example, for the telemetry analysis, understanding the mean
and the distribution of counter values (e.g., app usage) is very important to IT companies.
Local model of differential privacy (LDP). Users do not need to trust the data collector and require
formal privacy guarantees before they are willing to communicate their values to the data collector.
Hence, a more well-studied DP model [12, 15], which first collects all users’ data and then injects
noise in the analysis step, is not applicable in our setup.
In this work, we adopt the local model of differential privacy, where each user randomizes private
data using a randomized algorithm (mechanism) A locally before sending it to data collector.
Definition 1 ([17, 9, 4]). A randomized algorithm A : V → Z is -locally differentially private
(-LDP) if for any pair of values v, v′ ∈ V and any subset of output S ⊆ Z, we have that
Pr[A(v) ∈ S] ≤ e ·Pr[A(v′) ∈ S] .
LDP formalizes a type of plausible deniability: no matter what output is released, it is approximately
equally as likely to have come from one point v ∈ V as any other. For alternate interpretations of
differential privacy within the framework of hypothesis testing we refer the reader to [27, 8].
Statistical estimation problems. We focus on two estimation problems in this paper.
Mean estimation: For each time stamp t, the data collector wants to obtain an estimation σˆ(t)
for σ(~xt) = 1n ·
∑
i∈[n] xi(t). The error of an estimation algorithm for mean is defined to be
max ~xt∈[m]n |σˆ(~xt) − σ(~xt)|. In other words, we do worst case analysis. We abuse notation and
denote σ(t) to mean σ(~xt) for a fixed input ~xt.
Histogram estimation: Suppose the domain of counter values is partitioned into k buckets (e.g., with
equal widths), and a counter value xi(t) ∈ [0,m] can be mapped to a bucket number vi(t) ∈ [k].
For each time stamp t, the data collector wants to estimate frequency of v ∈ [k] : ht(v) = 1n · |{i :
vi(t) = v}| as hˆt(v). The error of a histogram estimation is measured by maxv∈[k] |hˆt(v)− ht(v)|.
Again, we do worst case analysis of our algorithms.
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1.2 Repeated collection and overview of privacy framework
Privacy leakage in repeated data collection.
Although LDP is a very strict notion of privacy, its effectiveness decreases if the data is collected
repeatedly. If we collect counter values of a user i for T time stamps by executing an ε-LDP
mechanism A independently on each time stamp, xi(1)xi(2) . . . xi(T ) can be only guaranteed
indistinguishable to another sequence of counter values, x′i(1)x
′
i(2) . . . x
′
i(T ), by a factor of up to
eT ·ε, which is too large to be reasonable as T increases.
Hence, in applications such as telemetry, where data is collected continuously, privacy guarantees
provided by an LDP mechanism for a single round of data collection are not sufficient. We formalize
our privacy guarantee to enhance LDP for repeated data collection later in Section 3. However,
intuitively we ensure that every user blends with a large set of other users who have very different
behaviors. Similar philosophy can be found in Blowfish privacy [20] which protects only a specified
subset of pairs of neighborhood databases to trade-off privacy for utility. On a different but relevant
line of work about streaming model of DP [14], the event-level private counting problem under
continual observation is studied [11], with almost tight upper bounds in error (polynomial in log T )
in [13] and [7]. [24] proposes a weaker protection for continual events in w consecutive timestamps
to remove the dependency on the length of time period T .
Figure 2: Privacy
Framework
Our Privacy Framework and Guarantees. Our framework for repeated
private collection of counter data follows similar outline as the framework
used in [16]. Our framework for mean and histogram estimation has four main
components:
1) An important building block for our overall solution are 1-bit mechanisms
that provide local -LDP guarantees and good accuracy for a single round of
data collection (Section 2).
2) An α-point rounding scheme to randomly discretize users private values
prior to applying memoization (to conceal small changes) while keeping the
expectation of discretized values intact (Section 3).
3) Memoization of discretized values using the 1-bit mechanisms to avoid
privacy leakage from repeated data collection (Section 3). In particular, if
the counter value of a user remains approximately consistent, then the user is
guaranteed -differential privacy even after many rounds of data collection.
4) Finally, output perturbation (instantaneous noise in [16]) to protect exposing
the transition points due to large changes in user’s behavior and attacks based
on auxiliary information (Section 4).
We now describe these components in more detail focusing predominantly on mean estimation. Later,
in Section 5 we present our experimental results and in Section 6 we discuss some details of the
deployment in Windows 10.
2 Single-round LDP mechanisms for mean and histogram Estimation
We first describe our 1-bit LDP mechanisms for mean and histogram estimation. Our mechanisms are
inspired by the works of Duchi et al. [9, 8, 10] and Bassily and Smith [4]. However, our mechanisms
are tuned for more efficient communication (by sending 1 bit for each counter each time) and stronger
protection in repeated data collection (introduced later in Section 3). To the best our knowledge, the
exact form of mechanisms presented in this Section was not known. Our algorithms yield accuracy
gains in concrete settings (see Section 5) and are easy to understand and implement.
2.1 1-Bit Mechanism for mean estimation
Collection mechanism 1BitMean: When the collection of counter xi(t) at time t is requested by the
data collector, each user i sends one bit bi(t), which is independently drawn from the distribution:
bi(t) =
{
1, with probability 1e+1 +
xi(t)
m · e
−1
e+1 ;
0, otherwise.
(1)
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Mean estimation. Data collector obtains the bits {bi(t)}i∈[n] from n users and estimates σ(t) as
σˆ(t) =
m
n
n∑
i=1
bi(t) · (eε + 1)− 1
eε − 1 . (2)
The basic randomizer of [4] is equivalent to our 1-bit mechanism for the case when each user takes
values either 0 or m. The above mechanism can also be seen as a simplification of the multidimen-
sional mean-estimation mechanism given in [8]. For the 1-dimensional mean estimation, Duchi et al.
[8] show that Laplace mechanism is asymptotically optimal for the mini-max error. However, the
communication cost per user in Laplace mechanism is Ω(logm) bits, and our experiments show it
also leads to larger error compared to our 1-bit mechanism. We prove following results for the above
1-bit mechanism.
Theorem 1. For single-round data collection, the mechanism 1BitMean in (1) preserves -LDP for
each user. Upon receiving the n bits {bi(t)}i∈[n], the data collector can then estimate the mean of
counters from n users as σˆ(t) in (2). With probability at least 1− δ, we have
|σˆ(t)− σ(t)| ≤ m√
2n
· e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
√
log
2
δ
.
We establish a few lemmas first and then prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. The algorithm 1BitMean preserves -DP of every user.
Proof: Observe that each user contributes only a single bit bi to data collector. By formula (1) the
probability that bi = 0 varies from 1e+1 to
e
e+1 depending on the private value xi. Similarly, the
probability that bi = 1 varies from 1e+1 to
e
e+1 with xi. Thus the ratios of respective probabilities
for different values of xi can be at most e.
Recall the definition of σ.
σ =
1
n
∑
i
xi (3)
Lemma 2. σˆ(t) in Equation (2) is an unbiased estimator for σ.
Proof: Observe that
E[σˆ(t)] =
m
n
· e
 + 1
e − 1 ·
∑
i∈[n]
E[bi(t)]− n
e + 1

=
m
n
· e
 + 1
e − 1 ·
∑
i∈[n]
xi(t)
m
· e
 − 1
e + 1

= σ(t).
Lemma 3. Let σˆ(t) and σ be as in Equations (2, 3). Let θ ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. We have
Pr [|σˆ(t)− σ(t)| ≥ θm] ≤ 2 · e−2θ2·n·( e
−1
e+1 )
2
. (4)
Proof: Clearly, for every i ∈ [n], we have
E[bi(t)] =
1
e + 1
+
xi(t)
m
· e
 − 1
e + 1
.
Let
µ = E
∑
i∈[n]
bi(t)
 = n
e + 1
+
nσ(t)
m
· e
 − 1
e + 1
. (5)
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Applying the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound [6, Theorem 2.8] to independent {0, 1}-random variables
{bi(t)}i∈n, for all t > 0, we have
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[n]
bi(t)− µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ t
 ≤ 2 · e− 2t2n . (6)
Combining (6) and (5) we get
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[n]
bi(t)− n
e + 1
− nσ
m
· e
 − 1
e + 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ t
 ≤ e− 2t2n . (7)
Combining (7), (3), and (2) we conclude
Pr
[
|σˆ(t)− σ(t)| ≥ t · m
n
· e
 + 1
e − 1
]
≤ 2 · e− 2t
2
n . (8)
Thus setting t = θn · e−1e+1 we obtain
Pr [|σˆ(t)− σ(t)| ≥ θm] ≤ 2 · e−2θ2·n·( e
−1
e+1 )
2
, (9)
which concludes the proof.
Proof:[Proof of Theorem 1] For any δ ∈ [0, 1], set δ = 2 · e−2θ2·n·( e
−1
e+1 )
2
. Then, error
θm ≤ m√
2n
· e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
√
log
2
δ
.
This fact combined with Lemmas (1, 3) completes the proof.
2.2 d-Bit Mechanism for histogram estimation
Now we consider the problem of estimating histograms of counter values in a discretized domain
with k buckets with LDP to be guaranteed.
This problem has extensive literature both in computer science and statistics, and dates back to the
seminal work Warner [26]; we refer the readers to following excellent papers [21, 9, 4, 23] for more
information. Recently, Bassily and Smith [4] gave asymptotically tight results for the problem in
the worst-case model building on the works of [21]. On the other hand, Duchi et al. [9] introduce a
mechanism by adapting Warner’s classical randomized response mechanism in [26], which is shown
to be optimal for the statistical mini-max regret if one does not care about the cost of communication.
The generic mechanism introduced in [4] can be used to reduce the communication cost in Duchi et
al.’s mechanism to 1 bit per user, which however only works for ε ≤ 2.1 Another major technical
component in [4] is the use of Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma to make the communication cost
polynomial in log k. This component seems very difficult to be used in practice, because it requires
from each user O(nk) storage per counter, and/or O(nk) time per collection. In our applications, n
(the number of users) is order of millions, and thus makes their mechanism prohibitively expensive.
[23] generalizes Warner’s randomized response mechanism from binary to k-ary, which is close to
optimal for large ε but sub-optimal for small ε.
Therefore, in order to have a smooth trade-off between accuracy and communication cost (as well as
the ability to protect privacy in repeated data collection, which will be introduced in Section 3) we
introduce a modified version of Duchi et al.’s mechanism [9] based on subsampling by buckets.
Collection mechanism dBitFlip: Each user i randomly draws d bucket numbers without replacement
from [k], denoted by j1, j2, . . . , jd. When the collection of discretized bucket number vi(t) ∈ [k] at
time t is requested by the data collector, each user i sends a vector:
bi(t) = [(j1, bi,j1(t)), (j2, bi,j2(t)), . . . , (jd, bi,jd(t))] , where bi,jp(t) is a random 0-1 bit,
with Pr
[
bi,jp(t) = 1
]
=
{
eε/2/(eε/2 + 1) if vi(t) = jp
1/(eε/2 + 1) if vi(t) 6= jp , for p = 1, 2, . . . , d.
1[4] requires ε ≤ ln 2 but we can optimize the parameters to loose the constraint to ε ≤ 2.
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Under the same public coin model as in [4], each user i only needs to send to the data collector d bits
bi,j1(t), bi,j2(t), . . ., bi,jd(t) in bi(t), as j1, j2, . . . , jd can be generated using public coins.
Histogram estimation. Data collector estimates histogram ht as: for v ∈ [k],
hˆt(v) =
k
nd
∑
bi,v(t) is received
bi,v(t) · (eε/2 + 1)− 1
eε/2 − 1 . (10)
When d = k, dBitFlip is exactly the same as the one in in Duchi et al.[9]. The privacy guarantee
is straightforward. In terms of the accuracy, the intuition is that for each bucket v ∈ [k], there are
roughly nd/k users responding with a 0-1 bit bi,v(t). We can prove the following result.
Theorem 2. For single-round data collection, the mechanism dBitFlip preserves -LDP for each
user. Upon receiving the d bits {bi,jp(t)}p∈[d] from each user i, the data collector can then estimate
then histogram ht as hˆt in (10). With probability at least 1− δ, we have,
max
v∈[k]
|ht(v)− hˆt(v)| ≤
√
5k
nd
· e
ε/2 + 1
eε/2 − 1 ·
√
log
6k
δ
≤ O
(√
k log(k/δ)
ε2nd
)
.
Proof: The privacy guarantee of our algorithm is straightforward from the construction. To analyze
the error bound |ht(v) − hˆt(v)| for each v ∈ [k], let us consider the set of users U(v) each of
whom sends (v, bi,v(t)) to the data collector. Let nv = |U(v)| and based on how each user chooses
j1, . . . , jd, we know nv = knd in expectation. Consider h
′
t(v) =
1
nv
· |{i : vi(t) = v and i ∈
U(v)}|; since U(v) can be considered as a uniform random sample from [n], we can show using the
Hoeffding’s inequality that
|ht(v)− h′t(v)| ≤ O
(√
k log(1/δ)
nd
)
with probability at least 1− δ/2.
From (10) and, again from the Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
|h′t(v)− hˆt(v)| ≤ O
(√
k log(1/δ)
ε2nd
)
with probability at least 1− δ/2.
Putting them together, and using the union bound and the triangle inequality, we have
|ht(v)− hˆt(v)| ≤ O
(√
k log(1/δ)
ε2nd
)
with probability at least 1− δ.
The bound of maxv∈[k] |ht(v)− hˆt(v)| follows from the union bound over the k buckets.
3 Memoization for continual collection of counter data
One important concern regarding the use of -LDP algorithms (e.g., in Section 2.1) to collect counter
data pertains to privacy leakage that may occur if we collect user’s data repeatedly (say, daily) and
user’s private value xi does not change or changes little. Depending on the value of , after a number
of rounds, data collector will have enough noisy reads to estimate xi with high accuracy.
Memoization [16] is a simple rule that says that: At the account setup phase each user pre-computes
and stores his responses to data collector for all possible values of the private counter. At data
collection users do not use fresh randomness, but respond with pre-computed responses corresponding
to their current counter values. Memoization (to a certain degree) takes care of situations when the
private value xi stays constant. Note that the use of memoization violates differential privacy. If
memoization is employed, data collector can easily distinguish a user whose value keeps changing,
from a user whose value is constant; no matter how small the  is. However, privacy leakage is limited.
When data collector observes that user’s response had changed, this only indicates that user’s value
had changed, but not what it was and not what it is.
As observed in [16, Section 1.3] using memoization technique in the context of collecting counter data
is problematic for the following reason. Often, from day to day, private values xi do not stay constant,
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but rather experience small changes (e.g., one can think of app usage statistics reported in seconds).
Note that, naively using memoization adds no additional protection to the user whose private value
varies but stays approximately the same, as data collector would observe many independent responses
corresponding to it.
One naive way to fix the issue above is to use discretization: pick a large integer (segment size) s
that divides m; consider the partition of all integers into segments [`s, (`+ 1)s]; and have each user
report his value after rounding the true value xi to the mid-point of the segment that xi belongs to.
This approach takes care of the issue of leakage caused by small changes to xi as users values would
now tend to stay within a single segment, and thus trigger the same memoized response; however
accuracy loss may be extremely large. For instance, in a population where all xi are `s+ 1 for some
`, after rounding every user would be responding based on the value `s+ s/2.
In the following subsection we present a better (randomized) rounding technique (termed α-point
rounding) that has been previously used in approximation algorithms literature [19, 2] and rigorously
addresses the issues discussed above. We first consider the mean estimation problem.
3.1 α-point rounding for mean estimation
The key idea of rounding is to discretize the domain where users’ counters take their values. Dis-
cretization reduces domain size, and users that behave consistently take less different values, which
allows us to apply memoization to get a strong privacy guarantee.
As we demonstrated above discretization may be particularly detrimental to accuracy when users’
private values are correlated. We propose addressing this issue by: making the discretization rule
independent across different users. This ensures that when (say) all users have the same value, some
users round it up and some round it down, facilitating a smaller accuracy loss.
We are now ready to specify the algorithm that extends the basic algorithm 1BitMean and employs
both α-point rounding and memoization. We assume that counter values range in [0,m].
1. At the algorithm design phase, we specify an integer s (our discretization granularity). We
assume that s divides m. We suggest setting s rather large compared to m, say s = m/20
or even s = m depending on the particular application domain.
2. At the the setup phase, each user i ∈ [n] independently at random picks a value αi ∈
{0, . . . , s− 1}, that is used to specify the rounding rule.
3. User i invokes the basic algorithm 1BitMean with range m to compute and memoize 1-bit
responses to data collector for all ms + 1 values xi in the arithmetic progression
A = {`s}0≤`≤ms . (11)
4. Consider a user i with private value xi who receives a data collection request. Let
xi ∈ [L,R), where L,R are the two neighboring elements of the arithmetic progres-
sion {`s}0≤`≤ms +1. The user xi rounds value to L if xi + αi < R; otherwise, the user
rounds the value to R. Let yi denote the value of the user after rounding. In each round, user
responds with the memoized bit for value yi. Note that rounding is always uniquely defined.
We now establish the properties of the algorithm above.
Lemma 4. Define σ′ := 1n
∑
i yi. Then, E[σ′] = σ, where σ is defined by (3).
Proof: Let a = xi − L and b = R − xi. Define a random variable zi as follows. Let zi = b with
probability a/(a+ b) and zi = −a with probability b/(a+ b). Then, E[zi] = 0. It is easy to verify
that random variable yi can be rewritten as yi := xi + zi. The proof the lemma follows from the
linearity of expectation and the fact that E[zi] = 0.
Perhaps a bit surprisingly, using α-point rounding does not lead to additional accuracy losses
independent of the choice of discretization granularity s.
Theorem 3. Independent of the value of discretization granularity s, at any round of data collection,
the algorithm above provides the same accuracy guarantees as given in Theorem 1.
Proof: It suffices to show that independent of the s, each output bit bi is still sampled according
to the distribution given by formula (1). We use the notation of Lemma 4. Be formula (1) and the
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definition of bi we have:
Pr[bi = 1] =
b
a+ b
(
1
e + 1
+
L
m
· e
 − 1
e + 1
)
+
b
a+ b
(
1
e + 1
+
R
m
· e
 − 1
e + 1
)
=
1
e + 1
+
(
b
a+ b
· L
m
+
a
a+ b
· R
m
)
·
(
e − 1
e + 1
)
=
1
e + 1
+
1
m
·
(
b(xi − a) + a(xi + b)
a+ b
)
·
(
e − 1
e + 1
)
=
1
e + 1
+
xi
m
· e
 − 1
e + 1
,
which concludes the proof.
3.2 Privacy definition using permanent memoization
In what follows we detail privacy guarantees provided by an algorithm that employs α-point rounding
and memoization in conjunction with the -DP 1-bit mechanism of Section 2.1 against a data collector
that receives a very long stream of user’s responses to data collection events.
Let U be a user and x(1), . . . , x(T ) be the sequence of U ’s private counter values. Given user’s
private value αi, each of {x(j)}j∈[T ] gets rounded to the corresponding value {y(j)}j∈[T ] in the set
A (defined by (11)) according to the rule given in Section 3.1.
Definition 2. Let B be the space of all sequences {z(j)}j∈[T ] ∈ AT , considered up to an arbitrary
permutation of the elements of A. We define the behavior pattern b(U) of the user U to be the element
of B corresponding to {y(j)}j∈[T ]. We refer to the number of distinct elements y(j) in the sequence
{y(j)}j∈[T ] as the width of b(U).
We now discuss our notion of behavior pattern, using counters that carry daily app usage statistics
as an example. Intuitively, users map to the same behavior pattern if they have the same number
of different modes (approximate counter values) of using the app, and switch between these modes
on the same days. For instance, one user that uses an app for 30 minutes on weekdays, 2 hours on
weekends, and 6 hours on holidays, and the other user who uses the app for 4 hours on weekdays, 10
minutes on weekends, and does not use it on holidays will likely map to the same behavior pattern.
Observe however that the mapping from actual private counter values {x(j)} to behavior patterns
is randomized, thus there is a likelihood that some users with identical private usage profiles may
map to different behavior patterns. This is a positive feature of the Definition 2 that increases entropy
among users with the same behavior pattern.
The next theorem shows that the algorithm of Section 3.1 makes users with the same behavior pattern
blend with each other from the viewpoint of data collector (in the sense of differential privacy).
Theorem 4. Consider users U and V with sequences of private counter values {xU (1), . . . , xU (T )}
and {xV (1), . . . , xV (T )}. Assume that both U and V respond to T data collection events using
the algorithm presented in Section 3.1, and b(U) = b(V ) with the width of b(U) equal to w. Let
sU , sV ∈ {0, 1}T be the random sequences of responses generated by users U and V ; then for any
binary string s ∈ {0, 1}T in the response domain, we have:
Pr[sU = s] ≤ ew ·Pr[sV = s] . (12)
Proof: Let {yU (1), . . . , yU (T )} and {yV (1), . . . , yV (T )} be the sequences of U ′s and V ′s counter
values after applying α-point rounding. Since the width of b(U) is w, the set {yU (j)}j∈[T ]
contains w elements {yU (j1), . . . , yU (jw)}. Similarly, the set {yV (j)}j∈[T ] contains w elements
{yV (j1), . . . , yV (jw)}. Note that vectors sU and sV are each determined by w bits that are U ’s (V ’s)
memoized responses corresponding to counter values {yU (js)}s∈[w] and {yV (js)}s∈[w]. By the
-LDP property of the basic algorithm 1BitMean of Section 2.1 for all values of y, y′ ∈ [0, . . . ,m]
and all b ∈ {0, 1}, we have
Pr[1BitMean(y) = b] ≤ e · Pr[1BitMean(y′) = b].
Thus the probability of observing some specific w responses of A can increase by at most ew as we
vary the inputs.
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Figure 3: Distribution of pattern supports for App A and B
3.2.1 Setting parameters
The -LDP guarantee provided by Theorem 4 ensures that each user is indistinguishable from other
users with the same behavior pattern (in the sense of LDP). The exact shape of behavior patterns is
governed by the choice of the parameter s. Setting s very large, say s = m or s = m/2 reduces the
number of possible behavior patterns and thus increases the number of users that blend by mapping
to a particular behavior pattern. It also yields stronger guarantee for blending within a pattern since
for all users U we necessarily have b(U) ≤ m/s + 1 and thus by Theorem 4 the likelihood of
distinguishing users within a pattern is trivially at most e(m/s+1)·. At the same time there are cases
where one can justify using smaller values of s. In fact, consistent users, i.e., users whose private
counter always land in the vicinity of one of a small number of fixed values enjoy a strong LDP
guarantee within their patterns irrespective of s (provided it is not too small), and smaller s may be
advantageous to avoid certain attacks based on auxiliary information as the set of all possible values
of a private counter xi that lead to a specific output bit b is potentially more complex.
Finally, it is important to stress that the -LDP guarantee established in Theorem 4 is not a panacea,
and in particular it is a weaker guarantee (provided in a much more challenging setting) than just the
-LDP guarantee across all users that we provide for a single round of data collection. In particular,
while LDP across all population of users is resilient to any attack based on auxiliary information,
LDP across a sub population may be vulnerable to such attacks and additional levels of protection
may need to be applied. In particular, if data collector observes that user’s response has changed; data
collector knows with certainty that user’s true counter value had changed. In the case of app usage
telemetry this implies that app has been used on one of the days. This attack is partially mitigated by
the output perturbation technique that is discussed in Section 4.
3.2.2 Experimental study
We use a real-world dataset of 3 million users with their daily usage of two apps (App A and B)
collected (in seconds) over a continuous period of 31 days to demonstrate the mapping of users to
behavior patterns in Figure 3. For each behavior pattern (Definition 2), we calculate its support as
the number of users with their sequences in this pattern (y-axis). All the patterns’ supports sup are
plotted in the decreasing order, and we can also calculate the percentage of users (x-axis) in patterns
with supports at least sup. We vary the parameter s in permanent memoization from m (maximizing
blending) to m/3 and report the corresponding distributions of pattern supports in Figure 3.
It is not hard to see that theoretically for every behavior pattern there is a very large set of sequences
of private counter values {x(t)}t that may map to it (depending on αi). Real data (Figure 3) provides
evidence that users tend to be approximately consistent and therefore simpler patterns, i.e., patterns
that mostly stick to a single rounded value y(t) = y correspond to larger sets of sequences {xi(t)}t,
obtained from a real population. In particular, for each app there is always one pattern (corresponding
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to having one fixed y(t) = y across all 31 days) which blends the majority of users (> 2 million).
However more complex behavior patterns have less users mapping to them. In particular, there always
are some lonely users (1%-5% depending on s) who land in patterns that have support size of one or
two. From the viewpoint of data collector such users can only be identified as those having a complex
and irregular behavior, however the actual nature of that behavior by Theorem 4 remains uncertain.
3.3 Example
One specific example of a counter collection problem that has been identified in [16, Section 1.3]
as being non-suitable for techniques presented in [16] but can be easily solved using our methods
is to repeatedly collect age in days from a population of users. When we set s = m and apply
the algorithm of Section 3.1 we can collect such data for T rounds with high accuracy. Each user
necessarily responds with a sequence of bits that has form zt ◦ z¯T−t, where 0 ≤ t ≤ T. Thus data
collector only gets to learn the transition point, i.e., the day when user’s age in days passes the value
m− αi, which is safe from privacy perspective as αi is picked uniformly at random by the user.
3.4 Continual collection for histogram estimation using permanent memoization
Since we discretize the range of values and map each user’s value to a small number of k buckets,
α-point rounding is not needed for histogram estimation. The single-round LDP mechanism in Duchi
et al. [9] sends out a 0-1 random response for each bucket: send 1 with probability eε/2/(eε/2 + 1)
if the counter value is in this bucket, with probability 1/(eε/2 + 1) if not. It is easy to see that
this mechanism is -LDP. Each user can memorize a mapping fk : [k] → {0, 1}k by running this
mechanism once for each v ∈ [k], and always respond fk(v) if the users’ value is in bucket v.
However, this memoization schema leads to very serious privacy leakage. There is a situation where
one has auxiliary information that can deterministically correlate a user’s value with the output
z ∈ {0, 1}k produced by the algorithm: more concretely, if the data collector knows that the app
usage value is in a bucket v and observes the output z in some day, whenever the user sends z again
in future, the data collector can infer that the bucket number is v with almost 100% probability.
To avoid such privacy leakages, we apply permanent memoization on our d-bit mechanism dBitFlip
(Section 2.2). Each user runs dBitFlip once for each bucket number v ∈ [k] and memoizes the
response in a mapping fd : [k]→ {0, 1}d. The user will always send fd(v) if the bucket number is
v. This is mechanism is denoted by dBitFlipPM, and the same estimator (10) can be used to estimate
the histogram upon receiving the d-bit response from every user. This scheme avoids several privacy
leakages that arise due to memoization, because multiple (Ω
(
k/2d
)
w.h.p.) buckets are mapped to
the same response. This protection is the strongest when d = 1. Definition 2 about behavior patterns
and Theorem 4 can be naturally generalized here to provide similar privacy guarantee in repeated
data collection.
4 Output Perturbation
One of the limitations of memoization approach is that it does not protect the points of time where
user’s behavior changes significantly. Consider a user who never uses an app for a long time, and
then starts using it. When this happens, suppose the output produced by our algorithm changes from
0 to 1. Then the data collector can learn with certainty that the user’s behavior changed, (but not what
this behavior was or what it became). Output perturbation is one possible mechanism of protecting
the exact location of the points of time where user’s behavior has changed. As mentioned earlier,
output perturbation was introduced in [16] as a way to mitigate privacy leakage that arises due to
memoization. The main idea behind output perturbation is to flip the output of memoized responses
with a small probability 0 ≤ γ ≤ 0.5. This ensures that data collector will not be able to learn with
certainty that behavior of a user changed at certain time stamps.
Consider the mean estimation algorithm. Suppose bi(t) denotes the memoized response bit for user i
at time t. Then,
bˆi(t) =
{
bi(t), with probability 1− γ;
1− bi(t), otherwise. (13)
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Note that output perturbation is done at each time stamp t on the memoized responses. To see
how output perturbation protects users from the data collector learning exact points at which user’s
behavior changed, we need to set up some notation. For an arbitrary T > 0, fix a time horizon
[1, 2, . . . T ] where the counter data is collected. Let x and x′ be two vectors in [m]T , let x(t) denote
the tth coordinate of x for t ∈ [0, T ]. Let A(x) and A(x′) denote the output produced by our 1-bit
algorithm + memoization. Let A′(x) and A′(x′) denote the output produced by our 1-bit algorithm +
memoization + output perturbation. Suppose the Hamming distance between A(x) and A(x′) is at
most δ. Then,
Theorem 5. Let S be a vector in {0, 1}T . Then, P [A′(x)=S]P [A′(x′)=S] ≥ γδ .
Recall that in the output perturbation step, we flip each output bit A(x(t)) independently with
probability γ. This implies,
P [A′(x) = S]
P [A′(x′) = S] = Π
T
t=1
P [A′(x(t)) = S(t)]
P [A′(x′(t)) = S(t)] ,
where we S(t) ∈ {0, 1} denotes the value of S at the tth coordinate. For a t ∈ [T ] for which
A(x(t)) = A(x′(t)), we have P [A′(x(t))=S(t)]P [A′(x′(t))=S(t)] = 1; this is true, since the probability used to flip the
output bits is same for both the strings. Therefore,
P [A′(x) = S]
P [A′(x′) = S] = Πt:t∈[T ],A(x(t))6=A(x′(t))
P [A′(x(t)) = S(t)]
P [A′(x′(t)) = S(t)] , (14)
Now notice that for a t ∈ [T ] for which A(x(t)) 6= A(x′(t)), we have P [A′(x(t))=S(t)]P [A′(x′(t))=S(t)] ≥ γ.
Thus, the lemma follows from Eq. (14) and from our assumption that |{t : t ∈ [T ],A(x(t)) 6=
A(x′(t))}| ≤ δ.
The theorem implies that if the user behavior changed at time t, then there is an interval of time
[t− δ, t+ δ] where the data collector would not be able to differentiate if the user behavior changed
at time t or any other time t′ ∈ [t − δ, t + δ]. Consider a user i and let xi be a vector in [m]T that
denotes the values taken by i in the interval [1, 2, ..., T ]. Suppose the user’s behavior remains constant
up to time step t, and it changes at time t, and then remains constant. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that xi(t′) = a for all t′ < t, and xi(t′) = b for all t′ ≥ t. Consider the case when
the output produced by our memoization changes at time t; that is, using the notation from above
paragraph, A(xi(a)) 6= A(xi(b)). Without output perturbation, the data collector will be certain that
user’s value changed at time t. With output perturbation, we claim that the data collector would not
be able to differentiate if the user’s behavior changed at time t or any other time t′ ∈ [t− δ, t+ δ], if
δ is sufficiently small. (Think of δ as some small constant.) We argue as follows. Consider another
pattern of user’s behavior x′i ∈ [m]T , x′i(t′) = a for all t′ < t∗ and x′i(t′) = b for all t′ ≥ t∗. Further,
if t∗ ∈ [t− δ, t+ δ], then P [A′(xi)=S]P [A′(x′i)=S] ≥ γ
δ . This is true because of the following reason. Consider
the case t∗ ≥ t. Then, in the interval [t, t+ δ], the output of 1-bit mechanism + memoization can be
different for the strings xi, x′i. However, Hamming distance of A(xi) and A(x′i) is at most δ. Thus,
we conclude from Theorem 5 that P [A
′(xi)=S]
P [A′(x′i)=S] ≥ γ
δ . The argument for the case t∗ < t is exactly the
same. Thus, output perturbation can help to protect learning exact points of time where the users’
behavior changes.
Consider a single round of data collection with the algorithm above.
Theorem 6. Using output perturbation with a positive γ, in combination with the -DP 1BitMean
algorithm is equivalent to invoking the 1BitMean algorithm with
′ = ln
(
(1− 2γ)( ee+1 ) + γ
(1− 2γ)( 1e+1 ) + γ
)
. (15)
Thus, for each round of data collection, with probability at least (1− δ) the error of the mechanism
presented above is at most
(
m · e+1(1−2γ)(e−1) ·
√
1
2n · log 2δ
)
, where δ is an arbitrary constant
between zero and one.
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Figure 4: Comparison of mechanisms for mean estimation (real-world datasets)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10
E
rr
o
r
Epsilon
BinFlip
BinFlip+
KFlip
4BitFlipPM
2BitFlipPM
1BitFlipPM
(a) n = 0.3× 106
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10
E
rr
o
r
Epsilon
BinFlip
BinFlip+
KFlip
4BitFlipPM
2BitFlipPM
1BitFlipPM
(b) n = 1× 106
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10
E
rr
o
r
Epsilon
BinFlip
BinFlip+
KFlip
4BitFlipPM
2BitFlipPM
1BitFlipPM
(c) n = 3× 106
Figure 5: Comparison of mechanisms for histogram estimation (real-world datasets)
Proof: Observe that the distribution produced by combining output perturbation in (13) with the
-DP 1BitMean algorithm in (1) is given by
bˆi(t) =
{
1, with probability (1− 2γ)( 1e+1 + xi(t)m · e
−1
e+1 ) + γ;
0, otherwise.
(16)
It remains to note that if in formula (1) we use ′ given by (15) instead of , then (1) yields the same
distribution as (16). Now to prove Theorem 6, we simply invoke Theorem 1.
5 Empirical Evaluation
We compare our mechanisms (with permanent memoization) for mean and histogram estimation with
previous mechanisms for one-time data collection. Note that all the mechanisms we compare here
provide one-time ε-LDP guarantee; however, our mechanisms provide additional protection for each
individual’s privacy during the repeated data collection (as introduced in Sections 3-4). The goal of
these experiments is to show that our mechanisms, with such additional protection, are no worse than
or comparable to the state-of-the-art LDP mechanisms in terms of estimation accuracy.
We first use the real-world dataset which is described in Section 3.2.2.
Mean estimation. We implement our 1-bit mechanism (introduced in Section 2.1) with α-point
Randomized Rounding and Permanent Memoization for repeated collection (Section 3), denoted by
1BitRRPM, and output perturbation to enhance the protection for usage change (Section 4), denoted
by 1BitRRPM+OP(γ). We compare it with the Laplace mechanism for LDP mean estimation
in [9, 10], denoted by Laplace. We vary the value of ε (ε = 0.1-10) and the number of users
(n = 0.3, 1, 3 × 106 by randomly picking subsets of all the 3 million users), and run all the
mechanisms 3000 times on the 31-day usage data with three counters. Recall that the domain size is
m = 24 hours. The average of absolute errors (in seconds) with one standard deviation (STD) are
reported in Figures 4. 1BitRRPM is consistently better than Laplace with smaller errors and narrower
STDs. Even with a perturbation probability γ = 1/10, they are comparable in accuracy. When
γ = 1/3, output perturbation is equivalent to adding an additional uniform noise from [0, 24 hours]
independently on each day to provide very strong protection on usage change–even in this case,
1BitRRPM+OP(1/3) gives us tolerable accuracy when the number of users is large.
Histogram estimation. We create k = 32 buckets on [0, 24 (hours)] with even widths to evaluate
mechanisms for histogram estimation. We implement our d-bit mechanism (Section 2.2) with
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Figure 6: Comparison of mechanisms for mean estimation (synthetic datasets: n = 0.3× 106)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10
E
rr
o
r
Epsilon
BinFlip
BinFlip+
KFlip
4BitFlipPM
2BitFlipPM
1BitFlipPM
(a) Constant distribution
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10
E
rr
o
r
Epsilon
BinFlip
BinFlip+
KFlip
4BitFlipPM
2BitFlipPM
1BitFlipPM
(b) Uniform distribution
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 10
E
rr
o
r
Epsilon
BinFlip
BinFlip+
KFlip
4BitFlipPM
2BitFlipPM
1BitFlipPM
(c) Normal distribution (truncated)
Figure 7: Comparison of mechanisms for histogram estimation (synthetic datasets: n = 0.3× 106)
permanent memoization for repeated collection (Section 3.4), denoted by dBitFlipPM. In order to
provide protection on usage change in repeated collection, we use d = 1, 2, 4 (strongest when d = 1).
We compare it with state-of-the-art one-time mechanisms for histogram estimation: BinFlip [9, 10],
KFlip [23], and BinFlip+ (applying the generic protocol with 1-bit reports in [4] on BinFlip). When
d = k, dBitFlipPM has the same accuracy as BinFlip. KFlip is sub-optimal for small ε [23] but has
better performance when ε is Ω(ln k). In contrast, BinFlip+ has good performance when ε ≤ 2.
We repeat the experiment 3000 times and report the average histogram error (i.e., maximum error
across all bars in a histogram) with one standard deviation for different algorithms in Figure 5 with
ε = 0.1-10 and n = 0.3, 1, 3× 106 to confirm the above theoretical results. BinFlip (equivalently,
32BitFlipPM) has the best accuracy overall.
With enhanced privacy protection in repeated data collection, 4bitFlipPM is comparable to the
one-time collection mechanism KFlip when ε is small (0.1-0.5); and 4bitFlipPM-1bitFlipPM are
better than BinFlip+ when ε is large (5-10).
On different data distributions. We have shown that errors in mean and histogram estimations
can be bounded (Theorems 1-2) in terms of ε and the number of users n, together with the number
of buckets k and the number of bits d (applicable only to histograms). We now conduct additional
experiments on synthetic datasets to verify that the empirical errors should not change much on
different data distributions. Three types of distributions are considered: i) constant distribution, i.e.,
each user i has a counter xi(t) = 12 (hours) all the time; ii) uniform distribution, i.e., xi(t) ∼
U(0, 24); and iii) normal distribution, i.e., xi(t) ∼ N (12, 22) (with mean equal to 12 and standard
deviation equal to 2), truncated on [0, 24]. Three synthetic datasets are created by drawing samples of
sizes n = 0.3× 106 from these three distributions. Results are plotted on Figures 6-7 for mean and
histogram estimations, respectively, and are almost the same as those in Figures 4(a) and 5(a).
6 Deployment
In earlier sections, we presented new LDP mechanisms geared towards repeated collection of counter
data, with formal privacy guarantees even after being executed for a long period of time. Our mean
estimation algorithm has been deployed by Microsoft starting with Windows Insiders in Windows
10 Fall Creators Update. The algorithm is used to collect the number of seconds that a user has
spent using a particular app. Data collection is performed every 6 hours, with  = 1. Memoization
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is applied across days and output perturbation uses γ = 0.2. According to Theorem 6, this makes a
single round of data collection satisfy ′-DP with ′ = 0.686.
One important feature of our deployment is that collecting usage data for multiple apps from a single
user only leads to a minor additional privacy loss that is independent of the actual number of apps.
Intuitively, this happens since we are collecting active usage data, and the total number of seconds
that a user can spend across multiple apps in 6 hours is bounded by an absolute constant that is
independent of the number of apps.
Theorem 7. Using the 1BitMean mechanism with a privacy parameter τ to simultaneously collect t
counters x1, . . . , xt, where each xi satisfies 0 ≤ xi ≤ m and
∑
i xi ≤ m preserves τ ′-DP, where
τ ′ = τ + eτ − 1. (17)
Proof: For z ∈ {0, 1} and an integer 0 ≤ x ≤ m, let p(z | x) denote the probability that the
1BitMean mechanism produces an output z on an input x, as given by (1). Let x1, . . . , xt and
y1, . . . , yt be two sets of arbitrary counter values. Here all {xi}i∈[t] and {yi}i∈[t] are non-zero,∑
i xi ≤ m, and
∑
i yi ≤ m. Fix some z1, . . . , zt ∈ {0, 1}t. We need to bound
R =
∏
i∈[t]
p(zi | xi)
p(zi | yi) . (18)
Let S = {i ∈ [t] | zi = 0}. We have
R =
∏
i∈S
p(0 | xi)
p(0 | yi) ·
∏
i∈S¯
p(1 | xi)
p(1 | yi) . (19)
Note that p(0 | xi) ≤ p(0 | 0). Thus using formula (1),∏
i∈S
p(0 | xi)
p(0 | yi) ≤
∏
i∈S
[
eτ
eτ + 1
· 1
p(0 | yi)
]
=
(∏
i∈S
[
1− yi
m
· e
τ − 1
eτ
])−1
.
It remains to note that ∏
i∈S
[
1− yi
m
· e
τ − 1
eτ
]
≥ 1
eτ
, (20)
as the product above is minimized when one of yi is set to m and the rest are zero. Therefore∏
i∈S
p(0 | xi)
p(0 | yi) ≤ e
τ . (21)
We proceed to bound the second product in (19). Since p(1 | yi) ≥ p(1 | 0), by (1)we have,∏
i∈S¯
p(1 | xi)
p(1 | yi) ≤
∏
i∈S¯
[(eτ + 1) · p(1 | xi)]
=
∏
i∈S¯
[
1 +
xi
m
· (eτ − 1)
]
≤
∏
i∈S¯
[
1 +
1
|S¯| · (e
τ − 1)
]
≤ eeτ−1.
Combining (21) and the inequality above, we conclude that
R ≤ eτ · eeτ−1, (22)
which concludes the proof.
By Theorem 7, in deployment, a single round of data collection across an arbitrary large number of
apps satisfies ′′-DP, where ′′ = 1.672.
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